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Abstract
After reviewing some classic contributions to the truly social social–psychological
literature (Lewin, Horney, Festinger), this commentary outlines how and why Kelley’s
analysis extends and complements more traditional approaches to interdependence.
Three strengths are emphasized, suggesting that Kelley’s analysis (a) offers a much-
needed situation-based taxonomy for different social orientations and interpersonal
phenomena, (b) serves the ecological validity of social orientations, and (c) potentially
helps us understand why classical dimensions of person judgment include not only
goodness versus badness, but also movement-related orientations such as dominance
versus submission, strength versus weakness, or activity versus passivity. Kelley’s
analysis can be extended by developing further domain-specific theory and methodology
for examining the temporal and sequential aspects of social orientations, and by
applying a means–end analysis to differing social orientations identified in Kelley’s
analysis. Finally, following Chuck McClintock (1972), it is argued that the field should
reserve the concept of social value orientation to define allocational preferences
relevant to valuing outcomes for self and others. This basic orientation should
meaningfully ‘drive’ the ways in which we approach interdependent others, solve
interdependence problems, and utilize interdependence opportunities.
INTRODUCTION
It is quite a challenge (to say the least) to comment on a target article written by one
of the fathers of interdependence theory—a theory that has exerted a great influence
on the thinking of many social psychologists, working in areas as diverse as
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cooperation and competition (e.g. McClintock, 1972; Messick & McClintock, 1968),
close relationships (e.g. Holmes & Murray, 1996; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik,
& Lipkus, 1991), conflict and negotiation (e.g. Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), intergroup
relations (e.g. Bornstein, 1992; Insko & Schopler, 1987) and decision-making in
social dilemmas (e.g. Komorita & Parks, 1994; Van Lange & Messick, 1996).
Commenting on Hal Kelley’s work is also difficult because his work
characteristically excels in precision and thoughtfulness (i.e. is it possible to detect
inaccuracies?) as well as in novelty and comprehensiveness (i.e. is it possible to
critique and extend this analysis?). This target paper is no exception, in that it offers
a careful, thoughtful, and novel extension of Kelley’s (1984) transition list analysis,
one of the most important contributions to ‘traditional formulations’ of
interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In this
commentary, I begin by reviewing some classic issues relevant to the concepts of
movement and locomotion and the theoretical roots of the transition list analysis.
Following this, I will outline three strengths of Kelley’s analysis of social orientations
and discuss two issues relevant to future theory and research regarding social
orientations.
THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVEMENT IN UNDERSTANDING
INTERPERSONAL PHENOMENA
Traditionally, the concepts of locomotion and movement have been emphasized in
several social psychological theories that are relevant to understanding social
orientations and interpersonal phenomena. For example, Lewin (1935) has
conceptualized social behaviour in terms of movement from one activity to
another toward the goal of maximizing satisfaction or minimizing the frustration
of a current need. Also, Horney (1939) identified three broad classes of social
interaction, all of which emphasizing movement: (a) moving toward people (e.g.
helping or pleasing others); (b) moving away from people (e.g. indifference,
insensitivity to others); and (c) moving against people (e.g. competition, conflict).
And, Festinger’s (1950) concept of group locomotion refers to the dynamic processes
by which groups may maximize successful goal attainment. Movement and
locomotion were assumed to be key concepts in the analysis of interpersonal
behaviour because these concepts stress the distinction between means and ends,
attempting to understand the interpersonal ‘routes’ one can take in relation to the
broader goals one seeks to accomplish.
Unfortunately, these models and concepts did not yield a logical conceptual
scheme (or taxonomy) of interpersonal situations that help us delineate, analyse, and
(ultimately) understand social orientations and interpersonal phenomena. For
example, Heider (1958) summarized his hopes—as well as his uneasiness—as
follows: ‘When Lewin developed topological psychology, I had at first great hopes
that it would furnish the tools for the representation and analysis of interpersonal
phenomena. However, though the concepts of his typology were of great help in
disentangling the underlying means–end structures in the actions of a person, they
were rather cumbersome and in many cases inadequate in dealing with two-person
situations’ (p. 14).
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I believe that Kelley’s (1984) earlier transition list analysis and the analysis of
social orientations advanced in his target paper would have satisfied Heider’s
primary concerns. The target paper complements and extends the transition list
analysis, and offers a new conceptual scheme for analysing dynamic forms of social
orientations and interpersonal phenomena. Throughout this commentary, I will
focus on two concepts: (a) social orientations, which I refer to as ‘interpersonally-
relevant behavioural tendencies’ and (b) interpersonal phenomena, which I refer to
as ‘the interaction-relevant and relationship-relevant consequences of social
orientations’. Later, I make a distinction between social orientations and social
value orientations, conceptualizing the latter in terms of interpersonal goals (i.e.
allocational preferences, such as maximizing joint outcomes, own outcomes, relative
advantage over others).
KELLEY’S ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ORIENTATIONS
Although Kelley and Thibaut (1969) distinguished among several types of
interdependence (i.e. outcome, informational, and response interdependence), in
interdependence theory (Kelley, 1983; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) they focused
primarily on outcome interdependence, or patterns of control over outcomes.
Features of outcome interdependence—degree and mutuality of interdependence,
correspondence of outcomes and basis for dependence—are assumed to form the
basis for a variety of social orientations, such as cooperation, competition, and
equality. Inspired by Chuck McClintock’s work on social value orientations, Kelley
and Thibaut (1978) extended their prior analysis (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) by
assuming that individuals do not merely interact in such a manner as to maximize
their immediate self-interest. By introducing the concept of transformation it is
assumed that individuals may take account of interdependence opportunities—and
constraints— in such a manner as to pursue broader interaction goals, such as
enhancing long-term self-interest, joint interest, or fairness.
These traditional formulations of interdependence theory have been extended by
Kelley’s (1984) transition list analysis which focuses on both outcome control and
transition control (i.e. control of movement from one interdependence situation to
another). In this analysis, interdependence is understood in terms of not only the
immediate outcomes associated with specific joint behaviours, but also the future
interdependent behaviours, situations, and outcomes that are made available—or
eliminated—as a consequence of enacting specific joint behaviours. Accordingly,
the transition list analysis overcomes the limitations of the outcome matrix by more
directly dealing with the sequential and temporal features of interdependence.
In his target paper, Kelley complements and extends the transition list analysis by
offering a conceptual scheme (or taxonomy) relevant to understanding (a) the types
of choice situations we might encounter in our interdependent relationships, and (b)
the behavioural rules that such choice situations permit. In addition to allocational
choices, Kelley distinguishes among four movement or transition-relevant choices,
including (a) pre-allocational choices, which affect the options relevant to
allocational choices available to the individual and the partner, (b) order choices,
which affect the order of the two person’s actions, (c) situational choices, which
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affects the features of the situation the two individuals will enter, and (d) choices of
situation-selection mode, which affect the manner in which the two individuals select
situations. Moreover, Kelley argues that situations differ in the degree to which they
afford these five types of choice (or behavioural rules). For example, situations
affording allocational choices are most ‘constrained’ in that they can only be
determined by considerations of outcomes, whereas situations affording a choice-of-
situation-selection-mode are least constrained. These latter type of situations afford
choices relevant to outcomes, information (permitting tendencies toward self-
presentation and attribution), control (permitting tendencies such as dominance
versus submission, initiative-taking versus passively waiting), situation selection
(permitting tendencies such as approach and avoidance), and situation-selection
control (permitting tendencies such as sharing or gaining power over situation-
selection).
Two illustrations may help the reader appreciate why the earlier transition list
analysis and current analysis of social orientations contributes to our understanding
of social orientations and interpersonal phenomena. First, research on
accommodation in relationships has revealed that individuals with strong
commitment to their relationship tend to respond constructively (rather than
destructively) to a potentially destructive, noncooperative act of the partner (Rusbult
et al., 1991). Accommodation not only affects the partner’s immediate outcomes, but
also provides the partner with a more congenial set of options (e.g. the partner is not
confronted with a situation which inspires retaliation). Thus, accommodative
behaviour is not only outcome-relevant but also movement-relevant, in that it shapes
features of future interaction situations. Second, research on experimental games has
revealed that individuals frequently wish to do more than simply cooperate or not
cooperate, particularly when the interdependent partner continues to behave in a
noncooperative manner. Many individuals wish to withdraw (rather than retaliate)
when confronted with noncooperative interaction partners (e.g. Miller & Holmes,
1975). It is clear that withdrawal is not only outcome-relevant but also movement-
relevant, in that withdrawal eliminates future options relevant to the dilemma
between cooperation and noncooperation.
THREE GENERAL STRENGTHS OF KELLEY’S ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL
ORIENTATIONS
According to Kelley’s analysis, the concept of social orientations describes several
interpersonally-relevant behavioural tendencies (e.g. cooperation/competition; self-
presentation, attribution, dominance, avoidance, power issues). What are the
strengths of this analysis? Does it provide a useful conceptual framework for the
representation and analysis of dynamic forms of social orientations and
interpersonal phenomena?
A first strength of Kelley’s target paper is that it provides a much-needed
situation-based analysis of social orientations, thereby ‘furnishing a useful set of
tools for the representation and analysis of interpersonal phenomena’ and thus
bringing us closer to solving the classic puzzle of how to represent and analyse
movement and locomotion in social interaction. By identifying several types of
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choice situations and the behavioural rules that these situations permit, Kelley’s
analysis of social orientations offers a conceptual scheme (or taxonomy) of situations
for understanding various social orientations and interpersonal phenomena. Such a
taxonomy is important for understanding social orientations and interpersonal
phenomena because it is the situation that ultimately affords (or limits opportunities
for) the expression of social orientations that in turn shape interpersonal
phenomena. In short, we need to understand first what a given situation is about
in order to fully comprehend the social orientations and interpersonal phenomena
we observe. A logical analysis of situations, then, helps in understanding the
different social orientations one can sensibly differentiate as well as the domains of
situations that permit the expression of such orientations. Incidentally, a situation-
based analysis can be construed as an antidote to models that focus on personality or
attitudes without explicit reference to the domains of situation that permit the
expression of such tendencies. How can one logically predict interactions of
personality and situation in the absence of a well-developed theory of situations?
Indeed, because Kelley’s taxonomy describes the possible sequential and temporal
features of interdependence, it provides a convincing case for the importance of
‘dynamic’ social orientations (such as dominance versus submission, approach
versus avoidance) in shaping interpersonal phenomena, and for understanding the
domains of situation that permit the expression of such social orientations. For
example, this analysis suggests the importance of the distinction between (a) ‘passive’
or reactive social orientations, in which the individual simply responds to features of
interdependence (which is the focus of much social–psychological research), and (b)
‘active’ social orientations, in which the individual shapes future features of
interdependence. Such situation-creating activities have received little attention (see
also Snyder & Ickes, 1985).
A second strength of Kelley’s analysis is that it makes an important contribution to
the ecological validity of social orientations and interpersonal phenomena. Indeed,
in many everyday situations current actions are not only outcome-relevant but also
movement or transition-relevant, in that actions may influence future outcomes,
options, and situations. Earlier, I illustrated the validity of the transition list analysis
by discussing the interpersonal consequences of accommodation in close
relationships and the withdrawal choice in experimental games. Beyond these
illustrations, several lines of research that were inspired by concerns with ecological
validity have employed paradigms that examine interpersonal behaviours that are
not merely outcome-relevant. For example, paradigms employed to examine issues
of ‘procedural justice’ have emphasized procedural processes that are distinct from
behaviours that directly determine outcomes (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Also,
inspired by Hardin’s (1968) description of the tragedy of the commons, social
dilemma researchers have begun to explore so-called resource management
dilemmas, situations in which a current action determines not only the immediate
outcomes for self and others, but also the state of affairs regarding the resource (e.g.
the extent to which the resource can replenish itself; Messick & Brewer, 1983).
A third strength is that Kelley’s analysis of social orientations may advance our
understanding of the ubiquitous dimensions underlying person judgment and
implicit personality theory. This classic work has revealed that implicit personality
theories extend a dimension of interpersonal goodness versus badness to include a
dimension indicative of dominance versus submission, strength versus weakness,
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social competence versus social stupidity, and activity versus passivity (cf. Osgood,
Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957; Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Wiggins, 1979). This is
important because it seems unlikely that an analysis that exclusively focuses on
allocational behaviours could fully capture the schemata that individuals employ to
organize impressions of interdependent others. Interpersonal goodness and badness
may be largely based on allocational behaviours, whereas dominance versus
submission, strength versus weakness and related impressions may be largely
based on movement-relevant behaviours.
TWO EXTENSIONS OF KELLEY’S ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL ORIENTATIONS
Is it possible to extend Kelley’s analysis of social orientations? I see two broad
possibilities: (a) developing domain-specific theory and methodology, and (b)
advancing a means–end analysis of Kelley’s taxonomy of social orientations.
Developing domain-specific theory and methodology
Playing the devil’s advocate, one might ask: ‘Isn’t the transition list approach much
more complex than the phenomena we seek to understand?’ In fact, Kelley raised
this issue in his presentation at the conference held at Leuven in 1991 ‘Social Value
Orientations in Interpersonal and Intergroup Relations’. Although transition lists
themselves are not exceptionally difficult to understand (or to construct), many
readers may resonate to that comment. Some of the complexity of the transition list
representation derives from the fact that this analysis does not focus on one
particular motive or one particular set of mechanisms. If it were to analyse one
particular motive (e.g. need for social approval) and/or one particular set of
mechanisms (e.g. tendencies toward favourable self-presentation), the analysis would
be limited to a narrow set of domains. And that is not what Kelley’s analysis is
about. Instead, Kelley’s analysis is intended to serve as an abstract, comprehensive
taxonomy of situation-based structures that can be used to identify a variety of
different social orientations that form the basis for understanding a variety of
different interpersonal phenomena.
So, is the transition list analysis more complex than the phenomena we seek to
understand? If we want to fully comprehend social orientations and interpersonal
phenomena, the answer is no. Interdependence situations are sufficiently complex
and multifaceted that it necessitates a sufficiently abstract and comprehensive
analysis of social orientations and interpersonal phenomena. One can even go as far
as to claim that the collective result of approaches that focus only on one particular
set of social orientations (e.g. allocational choices) in one particular domain (e.g.
situations affording only allocational choices) is likely to yield a ‘deficient
equilibrium’. That is, we would seriously overlook psychologically rich tendencies
(i.e. the interplay of a variety of different social orientations) that help us understand
interpersonal phenomena. For example, would our understanding of interpersonal
conflict not be enhanced if we take into consideration not only their allocational
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patterns of behaviours (e.g. cooperation, competition), but also movement-relevant
behaviours, such as approach versus avoidance, or dominance versus submission?
Nevertheless, given that a transition list-based analysis is abstract and
comprehensive, it does challenge our theoretical skills to ‘apply’ this type of
analysis to a given domain that is relevant to understanding a particular
interpersonal phenomenon. In fact, it may not always be evident how such a
comprehensive analysis directly contributes to our understanding of a given
phenomenon. Because interdependence situations are complex and multifaceted,
one important task is to delineate the key interdependence features of situations that
underlie social orientations and interpersonal phenomena in a given domain (i.e. we
need to understand first what the situation is about in order to understand
orientations and phenomena). Also, in our empirical investigations, we typically seek
to simplify interdependence situations so as to focus on what we believe is the ‘heart
of the matter’. Although research on social orientations and interpersonal
phenomena is quite rich in terms of methodology, it is also clear that Kelley’s
analysis of social orientations provides conceptual tools, not methodological tools.
Thus, one important task is to develop further methodology that is suitable for
capturing the interpersonal and psychological richness suggested by Kelley’s
analysis.
Advancing a means–end analysis of Kelley’s taxonomy of social orientations
A second extension follows most directly from my earlier discussion of movement
and locomotion, which were assumed to be key concepts in the analysis of
interpersonal behaviour because they stress the distinction between means and ends.
Kelley’s analysis of social orientations leaves open the question of whether the
differing choices (i.e. allocational, pre-allocational, order, situational choices, choice
of situation-selection mode) differ in the extent to which they represent means or
goals. Would a means–end analysis not help us understand the interpersonal ‘routes’
one can take in relation to the broader goals one seeks to accomplish?
Why is a means–end analysis important? Theoretically, a means–end analysis
serves at least three (interrelated) purposes. First, such an analysis is likely to
enhance the explanatory power of the theory. How can we explain different
interdependent behaviours, in the absence of a theory about the broader
interpersonal goals individuals seek to accomplish? For example, what exactly
does it mean when we observe an interaction in which one takes the initiative and the
other passively waits, without a theory about the interpersonal goals that these
individuals seek to pursue? Second, by advancing a means–end analysis, the theory
might benefit from some ‘prescriptive’ or ‘normative’ qualities, helping us to identify
rational and adaptive versus irrational and maladaptive means for pursuing a given
interpersonal goal. Indeed, we can only judge the rationality of an individual’s
actions if we fully understand the goals that he or she wishes to accomplish (cf. the
goal-prescribes-rationality principle; Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Finally, a
theory that is able to identify broader interpersonal goals and the possible means for
realizing such goals may also be fruitful for designing intervention strategies aimed
at resolving powerful conflicts between individuals. For example, some conflicts may
be created in the sense that individuals have used imperfect means for realizing
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interpersonal goals, whereas other conflicts simply represent the fact that the
broader social goals are conflicting (e.g. two individuals facing a social dilemma are
simply unwilling to set aside some of their direct personal interests).
How can one accomplish the theoretical goal of conceptualizing the differing
social orientations in terms of goals and means? Following traditional formulations
of interdependence theory, this may be accomplished by using the transformation
concept (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988), which defines
broader interpersonal goals (e.g. long-term self-interest, broadened social interests,
such as cooperation, competition, or fairness) in addition to the goal of pursuing
immediate self-interest (i.e. when individuals do not transform a given
interdependence situation). Irrespective of whether these interpersonal goals are
guided by dispositional orientations, relationship-specific orientations, or social
norms (Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996), such goals are undoubtedly important to
understanding allocational and movement-relevant behaviours in settings of
interdependence.
It seems reasonable to regard allocational preferences as ones reflecting
interpersonal goals rather than interaction-relevant means. Preferences regarding
movement-related choices (i.e. preallocational choices, order choices, situational
choices, and choices of situation-selection mode) seem more closely linked to
interaction-relevant means for realizing broader interpersonal goals. Consider, for
example, an interaction between John following a tit-for-tat strategy, and Michael
who seeks to maximize relative advantage over John’s outcomes (i.e. Michael is
competitive). How would we account for the observation that Michael gradually
moves away from John (i.e. avoidance)? We can explain such situation selections by
Michael’s realizing that it is logically impossible to really beat tit-for-tat (i.e. tit-for-
tat ‘punishes’ attempts to exploitation). John’s strategy prevents Michael from
accomplishing his primary interpersonal goal, and so Michael may wish to avoid
John. Thus, this example illustrates a more general point—many behaviours
(whether they are allocational or movement-related) can only be understood by
taking account of interpersonal goals. And, in the final analysis, I believe that the
interpersonal goals underlying the transformation concept (such as cooperation and
competition) form an important basis for understanding the outcome and
movement-relevant patterns of behaviour we observe among individuals.
Of course, it is not easy to cleanly differentiate between means and ends, in that
means can take on value in themselves. For example, dominance may become a goal
in itself after repeatedly experiencing the efficacy of such means toward achieving
desired goals. One might be tempted to develop a scheme consisting of a hierarchy of
goals— for example, in several interdependence situations, achieving fair outcomes
might be the primary goal, and using fair procedures, such as turn-taking, might be a
secondary goal. Similarly, one might be tempted to develop a scheme consisting of a
hierarchy of means— for example, structural means to solving interpersonal conflict
might be considered as more primary than nonstructural means, in which individuals
will still be facing the situation that inspires conflict (cf. Messick & Brewer, 1983).
The fact that I discuss hierarchies of goals and means might be taken to indicate that
a means–end analysis is indeed quite a challenge, and certainly more easily said than
done.
Finally, Kelley’s analysis focuses on social orientations, which is a useful concept
to define behavioural tendencies underlying both allocational choices and
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movement-relevant choices. Yet, following Chuck McClintock, the field should
reserve the concept of social value orientation to define allocational preferences
relevant to valuing outcomes for self and others. The underlying assumption is that
our social value orientations, at least to a significant degree, ‘drive’ the ways in which
we approach interdependent others, solve interdependence problems, and utilize
interdependence opportunities. Social value orientations reflect interpersonal goals
relevant to understanding both allocational and movement-relevant behaviour.
Indeed, as outlined by Chuck McClintock: ‘The values that are assigned to various
alternatives determine the direction of human behavior’ (McClintock, 1972;
Corollary 2, p. 440; emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
Kelley’s analysis of social orientations extends prior analyses by offering a
conceptual framework for understanding various social orientations, including
allocational behaviours (e.g. cooperation, competition, fairness) as well as
movement-relevant behaviours (e.g. dominance versus submission, approach
versus avoidance). This analysis offers a much-needed situation-based taxonomy
for different social orientations and interpersonal phenomena. Moreover, this
analysis serves the ecological validity of social orientations and potentially helps us
understand why classical dimensions of person judgment include not only goodness
versus badness, but also movement-related orientations such as dominance versus
submission, strength versus weakness, or activity versus passivity. Kelley’s analysis
can be extended by developing further domain-specific theory and methodology for
examining the temporal and sequential aspects of social orientations, and by
applying a means–end analysis to the differing social orientations identified in
Kelley’s analysis. To fully comprehend patterns of interaction, we need to
understand the interpersonal goals that individuals seek to accomplish.
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